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ABSTRACT 
This is a very condensed examination of the reciprocal interactions 
Between agriculture and industry in the development process. It is argued that 
today's 'late developing countries' -- those characterised by an economic structure 
in which agriculture still accounts for some 60 to 80 per cent of the country's 
total labour force and By rapid rates of growth of both population and labour force 
-— confront special -problems and opportunities. One consequence of those structural/ 
demographic characteristics is that the nature and time sequence of farm innovations 
will determine the proportion of a country's farmers that is able to participate 
in the process of agricultural modernisation. And whether or not a country's agri-
cultural strategy leads to wide participation of the rural population in technical 
and economic advance has major implications for the achievement of both the economic 
and social goals of national development. 
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To define the agriculture-industry continuum is not an easy task. lor 
the high-income, developed countries the continuum is evident in a long, ev iutionary 
process whereby countries that were overwhelmingly agricultural at some time"in the 
nineteenth century were transformed into modern, industrial economies.. This 
transformation took place even earlier in England. The transformation has been most 
apparent in the drastic change it brought about in the occupational composition of 
the labour force. However, a more fundamental feature of the economic transformation 
has been the growth of specialisation and increased economic interdependence 
between agriculture and the other sectors and among producing units throughout the 
economy. 
This specialisation has had effects that have gone far beyond those 
emphasised by Adam Smith. It has, of course, facilitated increased use of capital 
equipment and of new sources of power, beginning with the steam engine, and these 
changes have multiplied the productivity of human labo ur. Other changes associated 
with the pervasive growth of specialisation and of differentiation in the roles of 
institutions and individuals have been even more significant than the increases in 
a country's capital stock and the increased scale of economic units needed to make 
efficient use of specialised machinery and the new sources of power. Simon Kuznets \ 
is undoubtedly right in suggesting that the most distinctive feature that sets 
modem economic growth apart from earlier periods of economic change is the extent 
to which economic activity has come to be based on science and science-based 
technologies. Specialised institutions - universities, research institutes^ the 
research and development departments of Industrial firms - and individual specialists 
scientists, inventors, innovating entrepreneurs - have created increasingly 
productive methods fortransforming resources into economically useful goods and 
services. And a tremendous increase in exchange, especially pronounced in che' 
expanded exchange of intermediate products - steel of many types and forms"machines, 
sulphuric acid, cement, caustic soda and a host of other products - has been 
necessary for this growth of productivity based on specialisation and the application 
of scientific knowledge to economic activity. 
What bearing do these interlinked changes associated with movement 
along the agriculture-industry continuum have on the problems of agricultural 
development? Let me begin to answer that question by briefly contrasting the 
position of agriculture in two countries at opposite ends of the agriculture-industry 
spectrum - the U.S. and Ethiopia. It is well known that in the U.S. only about five 
per cent of the country's labour force is engaged in growing crops and raiding 
livestock,, Even if we add the workers engaged in indirect agricultural production -
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i.e. in producing tractors, fertilisers and other inputs purchased by farmers - the 
percentage is still remarkably small- If we look back to the 1820's, however, we 
find that some 75 per cent of the U.S. work force was still engaged in agriculture 
The proportion of the population engaged in nonfarm occupations at that time was 
obviously very small - although not quite as small as in Ethiopia today. Thus, the 
U.S. farm economy of 150 years ago had many of the characteristics of an agricultural 
sector that is still heavily oriented toward subsistence production. 
The fact that farming activities were directed in large measure to 
satisfying the subsistence requirements of the farm household was a necessity -
but it was also regarded as a virtue, A good farmer of that day was esteemed for 
being self-sufficient, restricting his monetary purchases to a very limited range 
of commodities that could not be produced within the family unit. With the expansion 
of both domestic and foreign markets for farm products, however, farming came to be 
oriented increasingly toward production for the market. By 1961, commercial sales 
of farm products were high enough to permit annual cash expenditures by the average 
.farm household in the U.S. of about $12,000, and 4 5 per cent of this total cash 
expenditure was devoted to production expenses, which do not include wages, rent 
and interest and tax payments as defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. A 
considerable fraction of those farm production expenses represented intrasectoral 
transactions such as purchases of seed or livestock feed from farms specialising in 
those lines of production. But the greater part represented purchases from the indus-
trial sector, including outlays for the repair and operation of farm machinery. 
Although agricultural production continues to have some distinctive features because 
of its dependence on the soil and on the biological processes of plant and animal 
growth, the similarities between agriculture and other industries have become more 
important than the differences. As a result of the continuing advance in scientific 
knowledge and of research and development activity leading to the development of 
more efficient technologies, usually embodied in specialised capital equipment or 
other purchased inputs, increases in the productivity of agriculture and in other 
sectors have led to an enormous expansion in the productive capacity of the national 
economy. The growth of productivity In agriculture, for example, has been as 
dependent upon the development of more efficient techniques for the manufacture of 
chemical fertilisers and a wide range of Increasingly sophisticated farm equipment 
as on the improv-i;;::;; of techniques employed within agriculture itself. 
Turning to the opposite end of the spectrum, we have a country such as 
Ethiopia in which easily 85 per cent of the population is still dependent on 
agriculture for work and income. Agricultural productivity and per capita incomes 
are extremely low, and this Is in large measure inevitable given the high degree of 
self-sufficiency and the technologies employed in the semi-isolated village communities 
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which are the dominating feature of the economy. Mot only Is a large fraction of 
farm output destined for the subsistence consumption of farm households, but most 
of the simple tools and other production inputs are provided within the farm household 
or perhaps by a village blacksmith or other local artisans, many of whom are also 
farmers. The specialisation that has evolved Is thus confined for the most part to 
the village community, and, apart from some Islands of modern agriculture, the 
knowledge that guides farm practices is based almost entirely on empirical insights 
that have been slowly and painfully acquired over many years. Very few of the farm 
households in these village communities are totally Isolated from the rest of the 
Ethiopian economy and the outside world. Some cash income is earned by sale of 
farm products through domestic commercial channels, but the domestic market outlets 
are inevitably small in relation to the number of farm units when only some 15 to 
20 per cent of the population is dependent on purchased food. Probably somewhat more 
important as a source of cash income for Ethiopia's farmers are the sales of coffee 
and other export products to consumers overseas. Nevertheless, according to a 1967 
survey of farm expenditures which is probably an overestimate of the overall situation 
since it concentrated on provinces where coffee Is grown, the total cash expenditures! 
by the average farm household amounted to oniy $130, just slightly over 1 per cent 
of the cash outlays by the average U.S. farm household in 1961. Oniy a quarter of 
the total represented farm production expenses, and about two-thirds of the outlays 
in that category were for the purchase of animals, a figure that may well reflect a 
bias in the sample but which is probably also inflated by the tendency to invest 
in livestock as a store of wealth, a tendency which Is reinforced by the lack of 
alternative forms of financial assets. 
On the other hand, the Ethiopian farmers covered by this survey allocated 
over 60 per cent of their cash expenditures to various consumer goods and services 
as a means of augmenting the very low level of consumption derived from subsistence 
production. In the U.S., the average farm household has pushed specialisation to 
such a degree that remarkably little food is produced for home consumption so that 
even farm households rely predominantly on purchased food. Nevertheless, purchases 
of food, drink and tobacco represented only 25 per cent of consumer expenditures in 
1961; and the total outlay for all consumer goods and services amounted to only a 
third of all cash expenditures by farm households-
These examples illustrate in a dramatic and somewhat extreme fashion the 
contrast between the high-income industrialised countries and late developing 
countries where the process of economic development has not yet brought about any 
very significant transformation of their predominantly agrarian structure. This 
subset of developing countries in which agriculture still accounts for some 60, 70 
or 80 per cent of the total labour force and a large though smaller share of G.N.P., 
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probably accounts for close to two-thirds of the world's population. Whatever the 
actual percentage may be, it is almost certainly an increasing fraction of the 
world total because of the rapid rates of population growth which are another 
distinctive feature of the late developing countries. 
In our joint study of the reciprocal interactions between agricultural 
development and the expansion of manufacturing and other nonfarm sectors, Peter 
Kilby and I have attempted to explore the ramifications of three conditioning factors 
which, in our view, are fundamental to an understanding of economic development and 
structural transformation in these countries. (This study, Agricultural and 
Structural Transformation• Economic Strategies in Late Developing Countries, is 
due to be published in 197 5 by Oxford University Press.) The first of these 
conditioning factors is the simple fact of being late, a fact that creates 
exceedingly difficult problems but which also offers special opportunities. The 
principal potential advantage derives from the existence of an enormous technological 
backlong that contemporary developing countries can draw upon. Because of being 
spared the necessity of investing the time and resources that are required to 
produce useful knowledge, these countries have an opportunity to achieve very rapid 
economic growth. But that is not only an opportunity; it is also an imperative if 
truly disastrous consequences are to be avoided. 
The existence of a large body of accumulated scientific knowledge and 
advanced technologies is a double-edged sword, a fact that is illustrated most 
dramatically by the half-completed demographic .'evolution that has been experienced 
by today's developing countries. The widespread impact of modern public health 
measures and other interventions — anti-malaria campaigns, mass innoculation 
programmes, local health centres or clinics able to dispense antibiotics and other 
drugs, improved transportation and the availability of free or concessional food 
imports to lessen the effects of drought or other calamities -- all of these have 
led to an unprecedented rapid reduction in mortality rates. Few would deny that this 
reduction in the number of premature deaths has been a great boon to the families 
affected. But, unlike the circumstances that characterised the demographic 
transition in the industrialised countries, this lowering of the death rate has not-
been accompanied by major changes in the structure or productive capacity of the 
economies. The fact that a rapid rate of growth of the total population is followed 
after a lag by even more rapid growth of the population of working age means that 
a high rate of expansion of employment opportunities outside agriculture is required 
in order for the nonfarm sectors to absorb more than a small fraction of the annual 
additions to the work force. But the experience of the past 25 years has demonstrated 
that even when non-agricultural production is expanding at rates of 5 or even 10 
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per cent per years the rate of increase in nonfarm employment 1s oniy a little more 
rapid than the rate of growth of the total labour force. Hence, the farm population 
and work force in these countries is continuing to grow at a rapid rate, and even 
the decline in the share of agriculture in the torai labour force is distressingly 
slow. 
The relatively capital-intensive and import-intensive character of much / 
of the investment that is taking place points to another dilemma. Because of 
being late-comers, these countries confront a large number of possibilities for 
increasing productivity in both industry and agriculture.. But this is a mixed 
blessing because of the strong possibility that many of the technologies that are 
borrowed will be ill-suited to their needs The contemporary industrialised 
countries evolved increasingly productive technologies as the frontiers of science 
and technical knowledge were expanded and as emerging scarcities of particular 
resources induced innovations to reduce demand for resources that were becoming 
more costly. Hence the technologies that are most readily available for transfer 
are by and large very capital-intensive because they were developed in response to 
a situation in which labour was becoming scarce and costly while capital was 
becoming a relatively abundant resource.. 
The likelihood of inappropriate technology transfer is, moreover, 
heightened by the distorted structure of relative prices which prevails in most 
developing countries as a consequence of the pursuit of a policy of import substitutio 
based on high levels of tariff protection, typically buttressed by foreign exchange 
controls, import licensing and quantitative restrictions on imports. In addition, 
the tariff structure and related restrictions usually have a very different Impact 
on capital goods as compared to final consumer goods. Because of a partial view of 
the development process and a strong preoccupation with the role of capital formation, 
governments have frequently allowed imports of machinery and other types of capital 
goods to enter duty free or at a very low tariff rate. At the same time, consumer 
goods are subject to tariff rates as high as 100 per cent or even more. It has been 
demonstrated that such a highly differentiated tariff structure is tantamount to 
subsidising the price of the capital goods that can be Imported duty free or at rates 
well below the average level of protection The effects of these foreign trade 
policies have generally been reinforced by certain other policies that have often 
been associated with them. Most pervasive in its effects is the practice of requiring 
institutional lenders, whether governmental or private, to charge Interest rates 
that are well below the opportunity cost of capital in these countries where capital, 
like foreign exchange, is an extraordinarily scarce resource. Accelerated depre-
ciation allowances and the operation of both import and investment licensing also 
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contribute to this underpricing of capital and foreign exchange, relative to 
labour, by influencing the decisions of the modern sector firms that have preferen-
tial access to supplies of those scarce resources. The result is an inappropriately 
capital-intensive pattern of investment within a modern or formal sector of the 
.economy which remains extremely small in terms of employment even though it absorbs 
'a large fraction of the available resources of capital and foreign exchange. 
A major consequence of this mix of policies is that economic growth does 
not lead to progress along the agriculture-industry continuum. Instead we typically 
witness an enormous gap, a veritable chasm, that separates a large agricultural 
sector still dominated by small, semi-subsistence farmers from a modern industrial 
sector of capital- and import-intensive enterprises which has many of the 
characteristics of an alien enclave. 
This generalised picture of dualism between a traditional agriculure and 
a modern industrial sector is, of course, an oversimplification. First of all we 
must note that a similar dualism often exists within agriculture itself. Most of 
the burden of financing the inefficient expansion of a highly protected domestic 
industry is borne by the agricultural sector. This de facto tax is collected in 
part by turning the terms of trade against agriculture. Protected firms in the 
domestic industrial sector are the beneficiaries of the high prices that farmers 
must pay for consumer goods and inputs. Farmers also receive relatively low prices 
for their export products because of the existence of an over-valued exchange rate 
defended by the various curbs on imports. In addition, farmers are often obliged 
to pay an explicit export tax or a de facto tax represented by the frequently large 
difference between a marketing board's purchase price and the world price. During 
the past decade there has been increased awareness of this burden on agriculture, 
but too often the measures taken to redress the situation have favoured a sub-sector 
of atypically large and capital-intensive farm units at the expense of the great 
mass of the rural population. This consequence is obvious in the case of duty free 
imports of tractors and tax rebates for fuel; but it also applies in large measure 
to subsidised distribution of inputs and to credit made available at artificially 
low interest rates so that the limited supplies available from institutional 
sources must be allocated by some form of non-price rationing. Although farm input 
subsidies and low interest rates are frequently justified as being needed to help 
the poor farmer, in practice the larger farmers with greater wealth and political 
influence usually receive the lion's share of those scarce resources. In the case 
of credit, the low-interest-rate policies also have adverse effects on the supply 
of savings and on the growth of financial intermediaries so that the typical farmer 
dependent on credit from non-institutional sources must pay a rate of interest even 
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higher than warranted by the high opportunity cost of capital in a capital-scarce 
economy. 
It is also necessary to recognize the role of firms in an informal sector 
engaged in small-scale manufacturing and a variety of service activities. These 
small-scale, labour-intensive units have many of the characteristics of agriculture 
as a self-employment sector in which a part of the labour force, unable to find 
employment in the modern or formal sector, manages to find some work and a meagre 
income. 
I will deal very briefly with the other two conditioning factors which 
Kilby and I regard as fundamental to an understanding of the structural transformation 
process in late developing countries, I have already alluded to one of them in 
suggesting that the growth of productivity and output in agriculture can only be 
understood within the context of the interdependence between agriculture and other 
sectors. Certain facets of this interdependence have received considerable 
attention in the literature on agricultural development: (I) the need to expand 
production and commercial sales rapidly enough to meet the food requirements of a 
growing nonfarm population; (ii) the importance of achieving a net transfer of 
resources from agriculture to the faster growing nonfarm sectors; (iii) the role of 
agricultural exports as a source of expanded foreign exchange earnings to finance 
a growing volume of imports; and (iv) the so-called contribution of agriculture in 
providing a major part of the additional labour required by the nonfarm sectors. 
Because of the structural-demographic characteristics noted earlier, however, it is 
more to the point to emphasise the reciprocal contribution represented by the 
expansion of employment opportunities in the nonfarm sectors which initially slows 
the growth of the farm labour force and eventually permits a reduction in the 
absolute size of the work force in agriculture. 
Other facets of this interdependence between agriculture and nonagriculture 
also have highly significant effects on development. In particular, it is essential 
to consider the level and composition of Intersectorai commodity flows. The 
extremely low level of farm cash receipts and expenditures epitomised by the 
Ethiopian situation illustrates the way in which the existing economic structure 
limits the volume of intersecxoral commodity flows. This constraint on the level 
of intersectorai commodity flows arises because, as noted earlier, the urban 
population dependent on purchased food is extremely small relative to the number of 
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' farm households. And because agricultural sales are thus limited, the farm sector's 
j demand for manufactured consumer goods and purchased inputs such as fertiliser and 
farm equipment is subject to a severe purchasing power constraint. This is, of 
course, not a totally binding constraint. Expansion of agricultural exports can, 
especially in small countries, make it possible for farmers to expand their cash 
income at a rate considerably more rapid than would be possible with exclusive 
reliance on the domestic commercial market. Nevertheless, for the cash receipts 
accruing to the average farm household to reach a really high level requires a 
considerable transformation of the overwhelmingly agrarian structure of a late 
jdeveloping economy. This purchasing power constraint has some important implications. 
It means that the nature and time sequence of farm innovations and associated inputs 
will determine the proportion of a country's farm households that will be able to 
participate in the process of agricultural modernisation. And whether or not a 
country's agricultural strategy leads to wide participation of the rural population 
in technical and economic advance will, of course, exert a powerful influence on 
the composition of rural demand for consumer goods as well as farm inputs -- and 
thereby shape the pattern of industrial expansion to a considerable extent. 
The final conditioning factor is closely related to the considerations 
that have just been mentioned. It concerns the interacting influence on the pattern 
of rural development of the size distribution of farm operational units and the type 
of technologies adopted. The average farm unit in a late developing country is 
inevitably small, but there can be great variation in the dispersion of farm size 
around the mean. For example, there is a strking difference between the relatively 
equal size distribution of farm operational units in Taiwan and the enormous contrast 
in Colombia between a very large number of small units cultivating but a small 
fraction of the agricultural land and a small number of very large farm holdings 
which account for the bulk of the cultivated area. Thus four-fifths of Taiwan's 
farms are within one acre of the mean farm size of three acres. In Colombia, however, 
only one-tenth of the farmsteads are within five acres of the mean farm size. The 
mean farm size of 56 acres is, in fact, a very misleading statistic. Most farm 
units are much smaller, while most of the farm land is in holdings many times larger 
than the mean farm size; the largest one per cent of holdings are on average nearly 
50 times larger than the mean farm size. Colombia is an extreme example of the 
concentration of land in large operational units, but whenever the expansion of 
agricultural production is concentrated in a sub-sector of large farms the size distri-
bution will be quite highly skewed. To the extent that the large farms which comprise 
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such a sub-sector dominate commercial sales of farm products, they will not be 
seriously constrained in rapidly expanding their use of purchased inputs of all 
kinds. The great bulk of the country's farm households will, however, be subject to 
a purchasing power constraint that will be even more binding than the structurally 
determined constraint discussed earlier. Hence, their ability to gradually modify 
their traditional farm technologies is bound to be severely restricted since most 
productivity-increasing innovations require some increase in purchased inputs. 
What are the implications of those three conditioning factors for the choice 
of strategy for fostering agricultural development? I want to emphasise a few 
propositions suggested by these three factors which appear to deserve careful 
consideration in many if not all late developing countries-
Clearly, one of the most demanding tasks that a successful development 
strategy must fulfill is to draw maximum advantage from the technological backlog 
while avoiding the pitfalls of borrowing inappropriate technologies, 'Getting prices 
right' can clearly assist in this task because a distorted structure of relative 
prices, especially underpricing of capital and foreign exchange, increases the 
likelihood that the technologies borrowed will be ill-suited to developing a country's 
resource endowment. There are, however, many other policy variables that exert a 
1 critical influence on both the rate and pattern of economic development. 
The basic proposition that I want to stress is that an agricultural 
strategy that leads to the progressive modernisation of a large and increasing fraction 
of a country's small farms is of central importance to achieving rapid economic growth 
and structural change which involves the whole population in the transition from a 
predominantly agrarian society to a productive and diversified industrial economy. 
It is fairly obvious that widespread involvement of the rural population in this 
process of technical and economic change will bring greater benefits to the large 
fraction of the population dependent on agriculture than a strategy that is concen-
trated on a sub-sector of large-scale farms using technologies that differ drastically 
from those employed by the great majority of farm units. It is less obvious,, but I 
believe that it can be demonstrated by historical evidence as well as logic, that a 
progressive modernisation strategy has significant economic as well as social 
advantages, 
First of all, by achieving fuller mobilisation of a country's indigenous 
resources such a strategy minimises the agricultural sector's requirements for the / 
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particularly scarce resources of capital and foreign exchange - and thus facilitates 
more rapid structural transformation. A sequence of divisible innovations that can 
be used efficiently by small-scale farmers has the effect of complementing rather 
than displacing a country's relatively ,vundant labour resources. Moreover, by 
fostering widespread increases in the productivity of the land and labour already 
committed to the agricultural sector, it is possible to achieve large increases in 
_total factor productivity, i.e. in output per unit of total inputs. The experience 
of Japan and Taiwan is especially impressive in the extent to which increases in 
factor productivity, based mainly on divisible, yield-increasing innovations 
affecting millions of small farm units, has contributed to the expansion of agricul-
tural production. 
A pattern of agricultural development that promotes widespread improvement 
in income-earning opportunities in agriculture also leads to a relatively equal 
distribution of income among the rural population. As noted earlier, the composition 
of rural demand for consumer goods and farm inputs associated with such a pattern of 
income distribution can be expected to provide a valuable stimulus to the growth of 
domestic manufacturing output. Moreover, much of this expansion will be In relatively 
small firms employing technologies that are much less capital- and import-intensive 
than plants in the large-scale 'modern' sector which use technologies that differ 
only marginally from those used in high-income countries with drastically different 
factor proportions. 
Furthermore, the pattern of structural transformation that results from 
widespread advances in productivity among the bulk of a country's farm households 
can be expected to make some highly significant contributions to the broader process 
of social modernisation. We must not lose sight of the fact that the transition 
from a low-income agrarian society to a high-income industrial economy must involve 
a good deal more than changes in the economic sphere. Most obviously, if progress is 
not made in bringing birth rates into tolerable balance with sharply reduced death 
rates, disastrous consequences lie ahead. On the other hand, if the pattern of 
agricultural development and other factors influencing rural attitudes, motivation 
and behaviour facilitate a fairly rapid spread of family planning, a given rate of 
expansion of farm output will lead to more rapid growth of per capita income and 
thus a greater increase in purchasing power to be devoted to productive inputs as well 
as to raising consumption levels. 
I will argue in a moment that a strategy of progressive modernisation is 
likely to accelerate the reduction of birth rates. In addition, such a strategy 
can be expected to generate considerable political and financial support for the 
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expansion of education in rural areas and also for programmes to improve the health 
and nutrition of the rural population which supplement the effects of rising per 
capita incomes. I am impressed by the arguments put forward by Carl Taylor, Asok 
Mitra and others concerning the potential contribution of maternal and child care 
programmes which provide a package of health, nutrition and family planning services. 
It has been argued, and with a good deal of supporting evidence, that reductions in 
infant and child mortality, which give parents greater assurance that the children 
they already have will survive, are of great importance in overcoming resistance to 
the practice of family planning. The argument has also been advanced that the 
changed attitude to the future that seems to follow better health and nutrition 
enhances receptivity to the novel idea of consciously restricting family size. Of 
equal importance, however, is the fact that widespread involvement in the process 
of technical and economic change and the strengthening of institutions and communi-
cations networks, which are both cause and consequence of progressively modernising 
the agricultural sector, will have similar effects on rural attitudes toward family 
planning. Eva Mueller's analysis of the interrelations between socio-economic 
factors and the degree of acceptance of family planning among farm households in 
Taiwan provides considerable support for that proposition. In particular, she 
found that the expansion of economic horizons and the rising aspirations which have 
affected such a large fraction of Taiwan's farm households, though of course in 
varying degree, appear to have contributed very importantly to the acceptance of 
family planning in Taiwan. She suggests, however, that where agricultural improvement 
is confined to a small minority of farmers, so that the great majority have no 
experience with progress and no reason to raise their sights, the changes in house-
hold preferences will be much less extensive than in Taiwan and the environment for 
the spread of family planning much less propitious. 
Rather than elaborating further on the advantages of a strategy of 
progressive modernisation, I propose to consider a few of the formidable obstacles to 
designing and implementing such a strategy. Probably the most obv us obstacle is the 
opposition of politically powerful groups who see an advantage in a more dualistic 
pattern of development which favours a modern industrial sector and an enclave of 
modern, large-scale agriculture. A highly skewed distribution of the ownership of 
land may, of course, create a political and economic environment that is hostile to 
the widespread modernisation of small farm units. For that reason it is often 
claimed that land reform is a prerequisite for achieving such a pattern of agricultural 
development. I happen to be persuaded that redistributive land reform is likely to 
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yield significant economic as well as social advantages, but needless to say, 
the fact that a number of my academic colleagues and I hold such a view has precious 
little bearing on the political realities in a particular country which will 
determine whether land reform is feasible or not. What I can say as an economist 
who has studied the problems of agricultural development for a good many years, is 
(that it is the size distribution of operational units, not ownership units, that 
is the crucial factor influencing the nature and sequence of technical innovations 
and thus the pattern of agricultural development. In addit ion, the weight of 
evidence seems to suggest that emphasis on rental ceilings or on the rhetoric of 
redistributive land reform without effective implementation is likely to be counter-
productive . 
Again I will make passing reference to experience in Japan and Taiwan. 
During the period prior to the land reforms carried out after the second World War, 
the widespread modernisation of small-scale farm units in those countries made a 
notable contribution to overall economic growth and structural change in spite of 
a highly skewed size distribution of ownership units. This was basically because 
the government's policies were effective in promoting the modernisation of the 
existing small-scale farming system, and the large landowners aimed at maximising 
their wealth by renting out their land to small-scale tenants or part-tenants rather 
than undertaking direct cultivation. I am mindful of the fact that the situation 
was one of great hardship for many tenant households. It is certainly to be hoped 
that with improved opportunities for rapid economic growth and the possibility of 
supplementing domestic resources with loans and grants from abroad small-scale farmers 
in developing countries today will have an easier passage to the position which has 
now been reached in Japan and Taiwan where the growth of employment opportunities 
throughout the economy has greatly improved the returns to labour in agriculture as 
well as in the nonfarm sectors. I would emphasise, however, following an observation 
made by Clifford Geertz in comparing Japan's experience with that of Indonesia, that 
in Japan, and also in Taiwan, the hardships borne by the farmers were not in vain 
because in both countries the pervasive modernisation of the existing small-scale 
farming systems made a notable contribution to the transformation of the agrarian 
economies. I would also argue, though without pursuing the matter here4the merits of 
a land tax which insures that a sizeable fraction of the differential rent accruing 
to farm land is mobilised by government units to finance investments in infrastructure 
and other development programmes. 
It may well be that in some situations, especially in Latin America, land 
reform is a necessary condition for pursuing a strategy of progressive modernisation, 
but it would be overly pessimistic to argue that it is always a precondition. More 
generally, I would suggest that two other sets of problems are likely to be more 
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difficult than the political obstacles in implementing an agricultural strategy 
aimed at the progressive modernisation of the agricultural sector. First are the 
many challenging problems of organisation and implementation which are involved in 
fostering technical and economic progress among millions of small-scale farmers. 
These are issues which have already received considerable attention at the Seminar, 
and I merely reiterate that they are complex and of crucial importance. 
The other problem area relates to the difficulty of reaching an effective 
consensus on the type of agricultural strategy to be pursued, a problem which 
compounds the difficulty of making the decisions needed to devise and implement a 
coherent set of policies and programmes. It appears to me that this is a problem 
which applies as much to donor agencies as to the governments of developing countries. 
Let me illustrate this problem by briefly sketching two alternative 
reactions to the challenges faced by developing countries which differ from the ideas 
I have advanced in opposite ways. One response has been to argue that the problem 
of increasing agricultural output at a sufficiently rapid rate is so enormous and 
urgent that it must be regarded as an overriding concern. Thus David Hopper stated, 
on the basis of his considerable involvement with India's agricultural problems 
during the 1960's, that increased food production must be regarded as "the priority 
objective. In the same paper, he went on to assert "that if the pursuit of produc-
tion is made subordinate to other aims, the dismal record of the past will not be 
altered"; and he specifically rejects the idea that tractor mechanisation should be 
discouraged because of what he describes as "its assumed impact on rural labour-force 
employment", the argument being that such policies would interfere with an increase 
in multiple cropping. Hopper and many others thus view the key policy issue as a 
choice between efficiency and equity. In emphatically opting efficiency, they 
dismiss goals other than the maximisation of farm output and give short shrift to the 
view that the efficiency of an agricultural strategy should be assessed in relation 
to its contribution to the multiple goals which, in my opinion, should be furthered 
by the modernisation of the agricultural sector. Hopper also gives little attention 
to the influence of the size distribution of operational units on the choice of 
techniques. It will be clear from my earlier remarks that I would contend that labour 
shortages are not likely to be a serious constraint on multiple cropping except on 
a typically large operational units, especially if small farmers have access to 
simple and inexpensive equipment of good design to ease emerging labour bottlenecks. 
According to the second of these alternative viewpoints, the problem of 
transforming a traditional economy and achieving widespread improvements in the 
wellbeing of the population is not really very formidable if only the country's 
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political leaders have the 'will' to plan the country's development appropriately. 
In this view, it is the cupidity and corruption of powerful vested interests that 
are the important obstacles to progress. Given a strong commitment to economic 
planning for the benefit of the whole population, the problems of low productivity 
and poverty could be readily overcome. My doubts about that view stem from a 
i conviction that the most effective governmental strategy for promoting rapid and 
1 efficient agricultural development is one that emphasises changing the production 
possibilities available to individual farmers. Such a strategy requires a combination 
of (1) agricultural research that generates technical innovations adapted to the 
needs of small-scale farm units with limited cash income and purchasing power; 
(2) farmer training programmes to assist in diffusing knowledge of more productive, 
scientifically based technologies; (3) investments in irrigation, rural roads and 
other types of infrastructure; (4) programme to improve the marketing of farm 
products and the distribution of inputs; and (5) appropriate and consistent policies 
related to prices, taxation and land tenure. Such a strategy Is based on a recogni-
tion of the significant advantages of decentralised decision-making by individual 
farmers and the fact that the price mechanism fulfills a critical and inherently 
difficult communications function by harmonising decentralised decisions and by 
harnessing the powerful motive of profit. On my reading c the evidence available, 
which I confess is based more on the well-documented experience of the Soviet Union 
than the approach pursued in Chin about which we know much less , detailed planning 
for the agricultural sector is less effective than a strategy which concentrates on 
improving the technical and economic environment in which individual farmers operate. 
According to another point of view, the shortcomings of the economic policies 
and of the past two decades, wr th their focus on the goal of increasing 
G.N.P. to the neglect of concerns about employment and income distribution, are 
deplored, but the emphasis is on direct measures to expand employment opportunities 
through massive rural works programmes and similarly large-scale programmes of 
nutrition intervention and other direct measures to improve the health and wellbeing 
of the population groups which have been by-passed as a result of development 
policies mainly benefiting the 'modern' sub-sectors in Industry and agriculture. As 
I mentioned earlier, I am persuaded that maternal and child care programmes which 
deliver a package of health, nutritional and family planning services to rural as 
well as urban areas merit high priority because the benefits of such programmes 
promise to be large relative to the costs. Yet, except for a few very selective 
activities, I am skeptical about the prospects for undertaking direct welfare 
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programmes on a sufficient scale to have a substantial impact. In countries where 
poverty is a huge and pervasive problem, it seems unrealistic to expect programmes 
based on the redistribution of income financed by taxation of the wealthier groups 
to be more than a mere palliative. Hence, it is essential to promote widespread 
increases in employment and in income-earning opportunities as an integral part of 
a country's strategy for agricultural development. 
I would like to conclude my treatment of this large topic by mentioning two 
issues which appear to be of critical importance to the success of efforts to achieve 
the progressive modernisation of agriculture. It has often been emphasised that 
improved seed-fertiliser combinations have a key role to play because they represent 
a divisible innovation that can be used efficiently by small farmers, and the 
potential for achieving substantial yield increases is usually very great. The rapid 
rise in fertiser prices during the past three or four years has, however, raised 
doubts about the viability of this approach in the years ahead. This issue involves 
a host of complex questions about fertiliser manufacturing technologies, the cost and 
availability of raw materials and the location of fertiliser plants. The conclusion 
that I draw from recent studies by the World Bank Fertiliser Study Group and other 
organisations is that there are sound reasons to expect fertilisers to again become j 
an abundant and relatively low-cost input within the next four or five years. 
Although it seems probable that the OPEC countries will be able to continue to maintain 
petroleum prices at recent high levels, it seems unlikely that monopoly pricing of 
fertiliser exports will be possible. Especially in the case of nitrogen fertilisers, 
the rather wide availability of supplies of natural gas, supplies that are large 
relative to the amounts required for fertiliser production, and the low opportunity 
cost of this input in many countries make it profitable to expand production capacity 
even on the assumption that prices will decline considerably from current levels. 
There is, however, a large question whether the necessary investment decisions to 
expand capacity will be made rapidly enough to eliminate the present excess demand 
situation in a reasonably short time. There is also a danger that the current high 
prices will encourage governments in a number of importing countries to build small-
scale, high-cost plants with the result that their farmers will be obliged to rely on 
expensive fertiliser from domestic sources rather than having access to low-cost 
imports. 
The manufacture of nitrogen fertiliser, being an extraordinarily capital-
intensive process that is characterised by substantial economies of scale up to a 
minimum capacity of at least 1,000 tons of ammonia per day, is a line of production 




and a severe shortage of capital. On the other hand, a number of the petroleum-
producing developing countries which have large supplies of investable funds and 
cheap natural gas, most of which is currently being flared, have a large comparative 
advantage compared to countries without natural gas and probably even in comparison 
with producers in Europe and North America who have access to natural gas but at higher 
opportunity cost. 
In contrast to fertiliser production, where the end products and manufactur-
ing techniques offer little scope for adaptation to differences in factor prices, 
the expanded manufacture of farm equipment in developing countries offers promise 
of making significant contributions to agricultural development and industrial growth. 
To realise this potential, however, certain conditions must be fulfilled. Increases 
in agricultural productivity and the growth of farm cash income must be spread widely 
so as to generate demand for relatively simple and inexpensive items of farm equipment 
that can be produced efficiently by relatively small-scale, labour-intensive and 
capital-saving firms which have not yet reached a high degree of technical sophistica-
tion. In some countries, notably in tropical Africa, the indigenous skills in foundry 
work and other metal working activities are still very limited. Some countries are 
making special efforts to stimulate rural industrialisation: for example, the Rural 
Industrial Development Centres, Village Polytechnics and Technical Institutes in 
Kenya. Those efforts are not likely to amount to much, however, unless the efforts to 
expand production capabilities by technical assistance and training are matched by 
an expanding demand for a widening range of products of modest but growing sophis-
tication which can be produced by such firms. 
The sharp increase in fuel prices and in the cost of tractors and spare 
parts seems to be having a dampening effect on the enthusiasm for the direct transfer1 
of mechanical technologies from the high-income, developed countries. By the same 
token, these conditions are sharpening interest in the possibility of easing labour 
bottlenecks and increasing the timeliness and precision with which farm operations 
can be performed by improving the range of animal-powered equipment and by the gradual-
spread of many other types of inexpensive equipment that can make a very broad contri-
bution to increasing the productivity of farm labour and at the same time stimulate 
progress along the agriculture-industry continuum, leading to economy-wide increases 
in productivity, output and employment opportunities. 
